2013 Singapore Grand Prix analysis: Where Sunday's race was won and lost

The real question, then, is whether Grosjean would have finished third or second ahead Alonso but for his luckless retirement. A definitive answer is, of course, impossible when pondering any such 'alternative reality' scenario, but two sets of statistics are certainly suggestive: one) excluding Qualy Two, Grosjean had been faster than Alonso in every timed session at Singapore last week; two) at the end of the race, when both cars were finishing their ultra-long stint on the medium tyres, Raikkonen's Lotus was far faster than Alonso's Ferrari, with the E21 on average a second quicker than the F138 on each of the final six laps after passing Jenson Button's McLaren. We'll never know for certain, but had Grosjean has still be on track, second place would surely have been his. Should Mercedes have split their strategies?
It's almost as if the team saw this question coming... According to Merc's post-race press briefing: 'The decisive moment of the race came on lap 25 when the Safety Car was deployed and both drivers stayed out. Pitting would have committed them to a 36-lap stint on a single set of tyres to make the finish. As was seen in the final laps, all but two cars were either forced to pit again or lost significant performance'. Which sounds fairly emphatic. However, let's look at the detail of that final line. The two cars in pertinent reference were those of Raikkonen and Alonso, Mercedes' closest on-track rivals, both of whom finished on the podium ahead of the two W04s. Now couple in the fact that both Nico Hulkenberg and Jenson Button finished in the points after pitting on lap 25, and Mercedes' decision not to hedge their bets and split strategies becomes far less convincing. If Sauber and McLaren both felt they could make it to the finish - which they did, albeit with some very poor lap times on their final tours of the circuit - then shouldn't at least one half of the Mercedes garage have followed suit? Then there's the question of whether Mercedes' management should have insisted on split strategies given that the inflexibility meant both Rosberg and Hamilton were fixed onto an ultra-aggressive strategy whilst occupying the same stretch of road. Split strategies, split the danger? If Mercedes made a mistake, it wasn't merely failing to cover themselves against Raikkonen and Alonso, but also pitting Rosberg and Hamilton into head-to-head combat which could have very easily - and very nearly did - ended with neither driver making it to the line. And a mistake it almost certainly was. "It would have been much better to have brought one car in when the Safety Car was in," lamented Niki Lauda, the team's non-executive chairman, afterwards. "Raikkonen and Alonso did the right thing. It was a strategic mistake - and we won't do it again." Just how far ahead would Sebastian Vettel have been but for the Safety Car?
There has been a lingering feeling after many of Sebastian Vettel's victories this year that the German had been racing well within his and the RB9's limits and for much of the race was holding just a little extra back should he come under sustained attack. That certainly wasn't the case at the end of the Singapore GP after F1's benchmark driver and car combination produced what at times was an astounding show of speed to win by 32.6 seconds. In pure stop-watch terms, not only was it the largest victory margin of Vettel's